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Kidd describes two methods of reasoning supposedly employed by Darwin, both put
forward by Darwin’s contemporaries in Victorian England. These are “analogical
deduction,” which he attributes to John Herschel, and “consilience of inductions,”
ascribed to William Whewell. Kidd then attempts to show that the arguments of
intelligent design theorists do not conform to these methods of reasoning.
Kidd’s critique of intelligent design would be more effective if he could tell us
why anyone writing today should be guided by the canons of these eminent Victorians.
He introduces his discussion with the sentence “Before looking at the arguments of the
intelligent design advocates, we should first examine the initial arguments used by the
scientists they are responding to” (p. 1). But why should we? Surely the design arguments
stand or fall on their own. To fault them for not employing the same methods of
reasoning as their opponents seems to beg the question in favor of the latter. Kidd needs
to do more to show that these methods have the universal validity he seems to attribute to
them.
What, exactly, is analogical deduction? Kidd’s example is Darwin’s comparison
between natural selection in the wild and artificial selection in domestication. I can see
how this is an analogy. In what sense is it deductive? Later we read: “The use of such
deductive analogies by Dembski differs greatly from their use by Herschel and Darwin,
however, in that they [sic] are not axiomatic; they make no attempt to deduce their
hypotheses upon [sic] laws which may be inferred from observations…” (p. 3).
If a hypothesis is deduced, in what sense is it hypothetical? The appropriate role
of analogy would seem to be in suggesting hypotheses. Once one has a hypothesis, one
can see what follows from it together with other statements one believes. That is the role
of deduction. If one of these deductive consequences conflicts with experience, either the
hypothesis or one of these other beliefs has to be given up. Where one’s hypotheses come
from is of little consequence. They may as well be arrived at by consulting sacred texts or
a Ouija board. Or from analogical thinking. But, I repeat, this process does not appear to
be deductive in any way. Perhaps Kidd is trying to address this problem when he says
that according to Herschel “scientific theories are axiomatic, and that laws governing
natural processes can be discerned through empirical understanding” (p. 2). But this
unclear statement is pretty much all we get. Is some kind of special insight or intuition
being postulated here?
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Kidd accuses Dembski and other proponents design of arguing as follows: if it is
conceivable that x is designed, and if we have not yet found an adequate naturalistic
explanation for x, then x must be designed (p. 4). I leave it to others to judge whether this
is a fair interpretation of Dembski.; it is hard to believe that anyone would consciously
employ such a patently flawed pattern of reasoning. Kidd rightly points out that a
scientific theory may allow for gaps that need to be filled in by further research.
Indeed, perhaps Kidd should have stuck to trying to show in detail that the
writings of intelligent design advocates tend not to conform to standard “epistemic
norms” or criteria for judging scientific theories, such as those that Kidd attributes to
Ruse: “internal coherence, external consistency, predictive accuracy, fertility, unificatory
power, and simplicity” (p. 2).
Surely, Kidd’s main point is right (even if difficult to extract): that intelligent
design is presented as a competing scientific theory to evolution, and as such, should be
held to universal standards for judging scientific theories. Support for intelligent design
as a scientific theory from the domains of law, politics, religion, etc. is simply irrelevant.
It involves a (mis)application of extraneous rules of discourse—a “conflation of debates,”
as Kidd puts it.
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